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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF A SO-CALLED
"CRITICAL ANALYSIS"
CHARLES ALAN WiuxcHT*
N the January issue of this Law Review, one Howard Newcomb
Morse, who has written widely if not wisely, offered what he
termed "A Critical Analysis and Appraisal of Burstyn v. Wilson."'
This case, it will be recalled, is one in which the United States
Supreme Court held that moving pictures are a form of communi-
cation within the constitutional protection of free speech and free
press, and that the constitution bars any attempt to censor a mo-
tion picture as "sacrilegious." This case is that rarity in our recent
constitutional jurisprudence, a unanimous decision; it has met with
universal approval in the law reviews; it has been praised by
powerful spokesmen for the denomination to which most of those
who wished to ban the particular motion picture involved belong.
Mr. Morse strikes a discordant note amid the general acclaim for
the Burstyn decision. "What the Supreme Court has done" he
tell us, "is to kick the pedestal of Christian morality out from
under our hitherto lofty system of law so that our system of just-
tice crashes to the ground * * *." 2 The plaint that morality has
not been given sufficient weight in judicial decisions is hardly a
new one; nearly 40 years ago the great Wigmore accused the
courts, and the Supreme Court in particular, of having been "cal-
lous" to "plain thieving." 3 But to make the accusation is not to
prove the charge; and four pages of overblown rhetoric does
not constitute a "critical analysis" as that term is usually under-
stood.
Mr. Morse fails to mention that less than a month before the
Burstyn decision, this very same Supreme Court had announced
that: "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being." I Does this sound like a Court that is poised to
kick morality out from under law, or to deprive jurisprudence of
the guidance of religious belief? I should have thought not, just as
I should have thought that Burstyn v. Wilson involves no issue of
morality. All that the case holds is that the state may not inter-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
I. 29 N.Dak.L.Rev. 38 (1953) The Burstyn case is found at 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
2. 29 N.Dak.L.Rev. 38, 39, (1953).
3. Wigmore justice, Commercial Morality, and the Federal Supreme Court; The
Waterman Pen Case, 10 II.L.Rev. 178, 184-5 (1915).
4. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
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vene to prevent those who are so minded from seeing a motion
picture which may be offensive to persons who accept the dogma
of the Virgin Birth.5 I happen to be one of those who believes
in that dogma; I think persons who do nof believe in the Virgin
Birth are quite wrong, but hardly immoral. Mr. Morse indicates by
the examples he chooses to discuss that he has not grasped the
distinction between morality, which is a matter of behavior, and
dogma, which is a matter of belief. Surely he is right when he
tells us that a court which condoned murder or stealing or adult-
ery would be twice wrong, for having ignored both man-made
and God-made laws of behavior. But the Supreme Court has not
done this; it has said only that we may believe as we wish.
This is where what must must seem a theological disputation
returns again to legal analysis. Mr. Morse has ignored the Court's
acknowledgment of a "Religious Being," and demanded more spe-
cifically a "Christian morality." On his side he has an old ill-con-
sidered dictum; 6 against him he has the First Amendment. The
real heart of Mr. Morse's attack is to be found in the following two
sentences:
"Mr. Justice Clark's injunction against 'favoring one reli-
gion over another' constitutes a negation of both the First
Commandment and the First Amendment. The Court has
interpreted the doctrine of freedom of religion to mean free-
dom from religion." 7
This is such utter nonsense as to be reminiscent of the slogans
in Orwell's 1984, "War is peace", "'Freedom is slavery,' and "Ignor-
ance is strength."' The First Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States says:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof * * *."
No thinking person would contend that his language is free from
ambiguities. But there is one thing which is clear from this
language, and which, so far as I know, no one except Mr. Morse
has ever disputed, it is that this Amendment does prohibit "favor-
ing one religion over another." To argue that a refusal to so favor
one religion is a "negation" of the First Amendment is an irrespon-
sible distortion, which will hardly be swallowed by anyone who
has ever looked at the Constitutional language. Perhaps this is
why Mr. Morse did not favor us by setting out that language.
Nor can the Morse position be strengthened by resort to the
5. Mr. Morse is clearly misinformed in asserting, 29 N.Dak.L.Rev. 38 (1953), that
the dogma offended is that of the Immaculate Conception.
6. -0 0 o [Tihis is a Christian nation." Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892).
7. 29 N.Dak.L.Rev. 38, 39 (1953).
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First Commandment, assuming, for argument's sake, that where
the Amendment and the Commandment are in conflict, the Su-
preme Court should follow the latter. The First Commandment
says: "Thou shalt have none other God before Me." An Episco-
palian, a Unitarian, and a Hebrew all worship the same God, and
thus obey that Commandment. They keep the Commandment,
though only the Episcopalian would accept the dogma of the
Virgin Birth,, and the Hebrew would find this dogma positively
offensive. Yet in the name of the First Commandment Mr. Morse
would demand protection for the dogma as a matter of "Christian
morality."
The Supreme Court last term refused to find in the First Am-
endment "a requirement that the government show a callous in-
difference to religious groups. That would be preferring those
who believe in no religion over those who do believe." 1 Is this not
the answer to Mr. More's charge that the Court has interpreted
"freedom of religion to mean freedom from religion"? The real
meaning of the First Amendment, according to the Court, is that:
"The government must be neutral when it comes to competition
between sects." 9
Mr. Morse's way is not only barred by the First Amendment;
indeed his view would subvert the end which he wishes to serve.
The way to promote morality is not to allow the censorship Mr.
Morse would uphold. Such censorship would require a Court
which refuses to play favorites among religions to approve the
banning of anything which would offend any of the 313 sects
which exist in this country.10 The same law which prohibited
showing of "The Miracle" would prohibit showing of "The Robe."
The result, of course, would be that nothing touching on religion
could appear in any movie, nor, presumably, could it be communi-
cated by newspaper or radio or books or television. All that would
be needed would be for one sect to find the picture or publica-
tion or broadcast offensive, and it would have to be stricken down
as "sacrilegious."" What would happen to freedom of religion,
and to promotion of morality, whether Christian or otherwise,
then?
Mr. Morse had the gall to call his paper a "critical analysis."
8. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
9. Ibid.
10. Bureau of the Census, Religious Bodies: 1936, Vol. I, iii, 7.
11. Thus the New York Court of Appeals, in the decision which the Supreme Court
reversed, had said that the standard was to be: [ 0 * N] o Religion * 0 * Shall be
treated with contempt, mockery, scorn and ridicule * 0 0- Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
303 N.Y. 242, 258, 101 N.E.2d 665, 672 (1951).
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The truth is that its principal vice is its uncriticalness. Starting
with an intuitive feeling that "The Miracle" should not be shown, Mr.
Morse has tried to defend that feeling by what seeks to pass for rea-
soning. Yet the logical end of the reasoning which he offers is that
either the state must prohibit that which any group regards as
sacrilegous, which would destroy religion, or it must favor one
group exclusively, which would destroy the First Amendment.
If such an attack on the decision in Burnstyn v. Wilson has no
other merit-and I think this to be true-at least it provides occa-
sion to reflect again on the wisdom of our forefathers, who made
religion free, and of a Court which deems it its duty under the
Amendment to "make room for as wide a variety of beliefs and
creeds as the spiritual needs of man deem necessary." 12
12. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
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